



Vivir y Morir por el
Threat Modelling

NICO WAISMAN

VP Latam en Immunity, Inc.

[@nicowaisman](#)







HACKERS

“Irrefrenable tendencias a cuestionar y reapropiarse de la tecnología”



LSD-PL vs ARGUS SYSTEM



Feature Directions

[eWEEK OpenHack III...](#)

- [Next](#)
- [Previous](#)

Read how PitBull Intrusion Prevention Systems were the target of thousands of serious hackers during eWEEK magazine's OpenHack III challenge...



Randy Sandone, Argus President and CEO, offers his perspective on the meaning of PitBull's success during the challenge...

[OpenHack III: Just What Did We Prove?](#)

RELATED SITES

- [Argus Revolution Security Portal](#)
- [NSA Flask Project](#)

LSD-PL vs ARGUS SYSTEM

Kernel Level Vulnerabilities

Behind the Scenes of the 5th Argus Hacking Challenge

by
Last Stage of Delirium Research Group

<http://lsd-pl.net>

GOBBLES VS THE WORLD

- × IIS X-Force pública una vulnerabilidad en Apache
- × Un problema con los enteros en el *Chunked Encoding* de Apache, permite sobrescribir la stack
- × El problema:
 - × `memcpy(stack, buffer, Size Negativo)`

GOBBLES VS THE WORLD

```
mad <da () securityfocus com>  
Jun 2002 13:48:20 -0600 (MDT)
```

ested that I forward this response to the list.

ability was originally detected auditing the Apache 2.0
ne 2.0 uses the same function to determine the chunk size
e vulnerable signed comparison. It is, however, not vul
due to a signed comparison deep within the buffered read
within `core_input_filter`).

is no more exploitable or unexploitable on a 32-bit plat
t platform. Due to the signed comparison, the minimum size
cpy() function is `0x80000000` or about 2gb. Unless Apache
tiguous stack memory located after the target buffer in me
on fault will be caused. If you understand how the stack
nderstand that this is an impossibility.

Cancel all my meetings.

Someone on the internet
is wrong.



GOBBLES

ApacheNoseJOB.C

```
andl $3,%ecx
```

```
decl %edi
```

```
decl %esi
```

```
rep movsb
```

```
movl 20(%esp),%ecx // COPIA EL RESTANTE
```

```
shrl $2,%ecx
```

```
subl $3,%esi
```

```
subl $3,%edi
```

```
rep movsl
```



GOBBLES

ApacheNoseJOB.C

```
andl $3,%ecx  
decl %edi  
decl %esi  
rep movsb  
movl 20(%esp),%ecx // COPIA EL RESTANTE  
shrl $2,%ecx  
subl $3,%esi  
subl $3,%edi  
rep movsl
```



GOBBLES

ApacheNoseJOB.C

```
andl $3,%ecx  
decl %edi  
decl %esi  
rep movsb  
movl 20(%esp),%ecx // COPIA EL RESTANTE  
shrl $2,%ecx  
subl $3,%esi  
subl $3,%edi  
rep movsl
```



VULNERABILIDADES UNICORNIO






Son of Heartbleed poses a major new threat to the internet

By Darren Allan September 20, 2017 Internet

OptionsBleed can be similarly exploited to cause data leakage



Heartbleed bug 'will cost millions'

Revoking all SSL certificates leaked by Heartbleed will cost millions of dollars, according to Cloudflare, which provides services to website hosts



▲ Image: Codenomicon

Revoking all the SSL certificates leaked by the [Heartbleed](#) bug will cost millions of dollars, according to Cloudflare, which provides services to website hosts.



KRACK ATTACK

KRACK attack: Wi-Fi connections vulnerable to hackers after flaw discovered

By Peter Marsh

Updated 23 Oct 2017

A security flaw can be used to hack Wi-Fi.

That includes your PlayStation and

The key reinstal discovered by B and are so serio Homeland Secu

How does

SECURITY NEWS

KRACK Vulnerability Means You Need to Change Your Wireless Approach

Tyler Lacombe November 22, 2017



WHY THE KRACK WI-FI MESS WILL TAKE DECADES TO CLEAN UP

Forbes **CommunityVoice**™ Connecting expert communities to the Forbes audience. [What is this?](#)

MAR 3, 2017 @ 07:00 AM 1,450

[The Little Black Book of Billionaire Secrets](#)

My Toaster Hacked The Pentagon: What You Can Do To Secure Your IoT Devices



Forbes Technology Council


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
POST WRITTEN BY

Forbes Technology Council

Successful CIOs, CTOs & executives from [Forbes Technology Council](#) offer firsthand insights on tech & business.



Research de VULNERABILIDADES



THRE

AT

Modelling

TU


DESAFÍO

NO ES EL

MISMO QUE

EL DE


OTROS







CANAL DE PANAMÁ





T	TORM TROJUS	25	0	DNK	0721	0545	COMRO	7		
N	CC	600.3	105.7	30/06	6/12	ASEA	0745	0515	COMRO	11
N	18-1303						0825			
T	JABROO II	21	0	GTAN	1130	GONRI	MTE			
N	CC	46.5	12.1	05/00	0/0	ASEA	FRM	1130	TROYA	MTE
N	18-0400 // TO UCUCATUN									
T	ZHANG YUANAO	28	Y	DKS	0750	0545	HERNA	4		
N	CC	470.0	72.2	20/00	4/6	ASEA	0807			
N	18-0400 // TO UCUCATUN						0805			
T	JIAN GUO HAI	03	N	BYHP	0810	0530	RODNC	9		
N	CC	590.3	105.1	27/03	6/12	ASEA	0901	0900	MDON	7
N	18-0949 // TO MFMORN									
T	KUJID REEFER	02	Y	PANX	1630	ROCAR	11			
N	CC	444.9	70.8	20/06	4/6	ASEA	1600			



T	SUJUHERRI	03	0	FRSRY	0814	1700	CASAL	110K		
N	CC	616.4	106.0	37/00	6/12	ASEA	0726	1700	CASAL	110K
N	26-0247 // TO UCUCATUN						0811			
T	CHICAGO HARMONY	03	N	MFNE	0719	1630	TUNON	9		
N	CC	599.9	101.9	31/02	6/12	ASEA	0758	1630	SAND	110K
N	26-0612 // TO MFMOORS						0851			
T	LAGOON PHOENIX	02	0	PAN	1815	ROVR	110K			
N	1-1007	439.7	68.3	21/06	4/4	ASEA	1207			
T	STOLY SPAN	28	Y	PANX	1630	CARRI	11			
N	CC	533.4	77.9	32/10	4/0	ASEA	FRM	1630	CARRI	11
N	27-0830 / NO RELAY / REG TUG									
T	BBC RUSHMORE	01	Y	PAN	1930	SOWLE	2			
N	CC	412.7	73.2	26/07	4/6	ASEA	0951			

T	SUJUHERRI	03	0	FRSRY	0814	1700	CASAL	110K		
N	CC	616.4	106.0	37/00	6/12	ASEA	0726	1700	CASAL	110K
N	26-0247 // TO UCUCATUN						0811			
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N	26-0612 // TO MFMOORS						0851			
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T	STOLY SPAN	28	Y	PANX	1630	CARRI	11			
N	CC	533.4	77.9	32/10	4/0	ASEA	FRM	1630	CARRI	11
N	27-0830 / NO RELAY / REG TUG									
T	BBC RUSHMORE	01	Y	PAN	1930	SOWLE	2			
N	CC	412.7	73.2	26/07	4/6	ASEA	0951			








Attack Trees

“Proveen una forma formal y metódica de describir los riesgos a los cuales se puede afrontar un sistema”












KEEP CALM



Por donde comenzará
realmente EL
ataque?



INTEL-DRIVEN CND



Source: Lockheed Martin

'Dear Valid LinkedIn User': Don't Fall for This Phishing Scam

by MARSHALL HONOROF Jr



UPDATE noon ET Monday
fairly convincing replica of t

Another day, another phishing
the delivery method for a cur

Yes, Your Users Are Dumb Enough To Fall For Phishing Scams



Angus Kidman

Sep 8, 2014, 12:30pm · Filed to: Australian Stories ▾

Share     

Dear Customer,

As part of our general security measures, we regularly check all the operations in the system. In a review we have recently encountered a problem associated with your account.

Please help us to bring to your account back in order. Until then, we have temporarily limited access to your account.


Where is the problem?

A recent change in your personal information (ie. change of address, email address, card information).


What should I do?

Please click on "Conflict Resolution" and confirm your identity by comparing your data to be the rightful owner.


INTEL-DRIVEN CND




INTEL-DRIVEN CND



~~“Estriotamente SEGRETO Y
CONFIDENCIAL.PDF.JAR”~~




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
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Documentos a fines

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


↓
ALIENSPY
ADZOK

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


~~“Estriotamente SEGRETO Y
CONFIDENCIAL.PDF.JAR”~~



↓
WINDOWS: RUN
REGISTRY KEY

~~“Estriotamente SEGRETO Y
CONFIDENCIAL.PDF.JAR”~~




Connect back to a DDNS.NET DOMAIN



EL
PERÍMETRO
O SON
LOS
PADRES

INTEL-DRIVEN CMD



for Enterprise


Below includes techniques spanning Windows, Mac, and Linux platforms and can be used to navigate through the knowledge base.

Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	
AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	
CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	
Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	
Control Panel Items	Applnit DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	
Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	
Execution through API	Authentication Package	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	
Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Password Policy Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	
Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Dylib Hijacking	Component Firmware	Forced Authentication	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Component Object Model Hijacking	Hooking	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	
InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	Extra Window Memory Injection	Control Panel Items	Input Capture	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		
LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	File System Permissions Weakness	DCShadow	Input Prompt	Query Registry	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		
hct	Component Object Model Hijacking	Hooking	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Kerberoasting	Remote System Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture		

INVOKE- ADVERSARY



MITRE CALDERA





EL
ATAQUE
EMPIEZA
DONDE
TERMINA
EL
CHECKLIST

Chrome File Edit View History Bookmarks People Window Help 94° 0.0K/s 0.0K/s U: 639.1GB F: 360.30B U: 7.81GB F: 8.38GB Fri 17:00 chris

innuendo

Package RPC Help Log

MENU Operations X Operation Info

Execute Results Results Details Data

Name	Domain Username	Impersonation Level	Sessi...	Restrictions	Mandatory Policy	Virt. A...	Virt. E...	Elevat...	Proce...	LUID
install_winpcap	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Impersonation	0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12861
list_tokens	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Impersonation	0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12810
MS15_051	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Impersonation	0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	524	9062
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Impersonation	0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12862
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12863
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12812
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12864
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12812
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12864
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12813
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	348	12853
	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM		0	true	VALID_MASK	Not su...	Not su...	Not su...	516	7537

Record ID: 90

88-99 of 302 (buffered 12)

Privileges

- download (filemanager)
- execute (filemanager)
- execute_python (manager)
- get_user_name (privilegemanager)
- inject_dll (manager)
- inject_sell (manager)
- install_driver (manager)
- install_winpcap (manager)
- keylogger_attach (recon)
- keylogger_detach (recon)
- terminate (manager)
- uninstall_driver (manager)
- uninstall_winpcap (manager)
- upload (filemanager)
- whoami (privilegemanager)

Domain Groups

- BUILTIN\Administrators
- BUILTIN\Users
- Logon sid - no association available
- Mandatory Label\System Mandatory Level
- NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
- NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE

Record ID: acf52cdt

10.0.0.100-8181/#

COMING USING



Gracias! s!

nico@immunityinc.com

(WE ARE HIRING!!)

